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Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the 
existence of an accurate disclosure and reporting regime that provides 
transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly 
listed companies. Today, a common post-financial crisis regulatory reform 
theme is to tighten the disclosure and reporting rules that apply to large 
blockholders. We examine the implications of this trend, analyzing whether 
detailed, stringent and mandatory reporting rules could have a 
counterproductive effect on the financial markets. A central idea of this paper 
is the evolution of a well-balanced regime that is flexible and proportional and 
allows for a case-by-case determination of a beneficial owner. In the current 
era of information-based technology, the most obvious challenge for 
regulators is to design a legal framework that is adaptable to technological 
change and its impact on financial instruments. 
 
Keywords: beneficial ownership, control enhancing mechanisms, corporate 
governance, disclosure, inside blockholders, outside blockholders, related 
party transactions, shareholders 
 














Mandatory Disclosure of Blockholders and Related Party Transactions: 
Stringent versus Flexible Rules 
 




 Corporate governance is important. An effective and sustainable corporate 
governance infrastructure helps promote investor confidence and assist firms in 
meeting investors’ expectations. Yet in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
policymakers and legislatures once again bemoan the absence of a corporate 
governance infrastructure that adequately protects minority investors and other 
stakeholders in listed companies.3 There is often a lack of clear solutions for 
(potential) conflicts in listed companies caused by concentrated ownership and 
control structures. This is somewhat surprising since the concentrated ownership (or 
blockholder structure) is historically the predominant corporate governance system in 
the world. Of course, the accumulation of control in one or more shareholders may 
very well benefit minority investors by making management more accountable, 
thereby reducing managerial self-dealing problems.4 However, controlling 
shareholders also have incentives to exploit corporate opportunities and engage in 
abusive related party transactions. The question thus arises whether a country’s 
corporate governance infrastructure is sufficient to protect minority investors against 
the adverse effects of controlling shareholder opportunism. 
 Obviously, minority shareholder protection will be particularly challenging 
without the identity of the de facto or de jure controlling shareholder being available. 
In this respect, disclosure and reporting regulation is probably the most crucial 
measure to directly or indirectly detect and discipline opportunistic and abusive 
behaviour by controlling shareholders. In general, the disclosure of ownership is 
required by direct shareholders, including custodians, who accumulate shares 
beyond a certain threshold. However, under the current market conditions, it is fair to 
                                                
1 Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Economic Law at Tilburg University, The 
Netherlands and Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
2 Erik P.M. Vermeulen is Professor of Business Law at Tilburg University, The Netherlands and Vice 
President at the Corporate Legal Department of Philips in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
3 See OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages, June 
2009. 




say that the disclosure of significant direct shareholdings is not enough to adequately 
protect minority shareholders. Controlling investors have innumerable ways to hide 
their identity and/or enhance control by leveraging voting power, such as pyramid 
structures, cross-shareholdings, non-voting shares, derivative products of shares 
(i.e., depository receipts), and investor coalitions and agreements (i.e., acting in 
concert). It is therefore important that information about a company’s ownership and 
control structures, including the identity of the ultimate beneficial owners,5 is also 
revealed. 
 The purpose of this essay is threefold. Firstly, it critically analyzes the legal 
and regulatory regimes and practices governing the disclosure and reporting of 
ownership and control structures in listed companies. We attempt to assess to what 
extent and through which channels relevant ownership and control information 
should be disclosed and provided to the company and its investors, the market and 
supervisory authorities. Secondly, since related party transactions are the prime 
mechanisms for tunneling by controlling shareholders, we explore the beneficial 
effects of the disclosure rules designed to target related party transactions directly. 
Finally, we investigate to what extent the rules that intend to prevent the misuse of 
corporate vehicles may serve to overcome the difficulties in the regulation of 
conflicted transactions. Indeed, it is generally accepted that the problem of related 
party transactions is closely connected to the disclosure of beneficial ownership. It is 
therefore interesting to see whether the mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership 
and control structures assists in revealing the preventing of self-interested related 
party transactions. 
 The essay is divided into six sections. The next section begins with a short 
discussion of the well-documented Enron and Parmalat scandals in order to explore 
the mechanisms employed by controlling shareholders to extract private benefits at 
the expense of minority shareholders and and other stakeholders. Section 3 
discusses the challenges policymakers and regulators face in their efforts to improve 
disclosure of beneficial ownership. Section 4 turns to assess the legal mechanisms 
designed to regulate related party transactions. Because the identity of beneficial 
owners is often concealed by the use of corporate vehicles, Section 5 considers to 
what extent that the rules designed to prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles could 
assist in obtaining on beneficial ownership and related party transactions. In the final 
                                                
5 See OECD, Report on the Misuse of Corporate Vehicles for Illicit Purposes. This report defines 
“beneficial ownership” in terms of the ultimate beneficial ownership or interest by a natural person. 
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section we conclude that the functioning of financial markets depends on the 
introduction of a proportionate and flexible disclosure regime for market regulators to 
mitigate the negative impact of related party transactions by controlling shareholders.  
 
2. The Enron and Parmalat Examples 
 
 The high-profile corporate fallouts at the beginning of the century have 
underscored the need for regulators to work cooperatively to create timely and 
effective solutions to improve disclosure and corporate governance policies. 
Whereas corporate governance failures usually occur at the national level, there is no 
denying that the recent financial scandals at Enron and Parmalat involved 
questionable dealings (chains of corporate vehicles, improper swap arrangements 
and flaws in financial disclosure) that took on a global dimension. These scandals 
provoked a variety of responses and brought the issue of governance and 
accountability to the attention of lawmakers and the public.  
 In the Enron case, for example, the underlying problems were the prevalence 
of significant related party transactions involving high-ranking officers of the 
company. Since independent parties would not provide economic hedges for its 
merchant investments, Enron engaged in hedging transactions with related entities 
that in theory allowed Enron to accomplish its temporary accounting objectives of not 
reporting any decline in the value of the investments. Since the hedges lacked 
economic substance, the temporary accounting results were unsustainable and 
eventually required the reporting of significant losses that surprised the marketplace. 
These transactions not only furnished these officers with the possibility to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the company, but also provided short-term accounting 
benefits that enabled Enron to materially overstate its earnings. Enron exploited 
accounting benefits that would not have been available in arm’s length transactions 
with third parties.  
 Likewise, Parmalat’s underlying problems were due to the massive fraud that 
was facilitated by the prevalence of special purpose entities (SPEs) and offshore 
subsidiaries that were used by the managers and officers to carry out illicit related 
party transactions. But, unlike Enron, it was Parmalat’s family-controlled 
management and advisors that structured the group’s various financial arrangements 
to enrich members of the Tanzi family at the expense of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, Parmalat is often described as the European Enron. To 
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see this consider the following facts. Until its collapse, the Parmalat Group was one 
of the world’s largest leading dairy and food products groups with operations in more 
than 30 countries worldwide. The company, which was controlled by the Tanzi family 
and operated out of Collecchio, Parma, was formed in the 1960s as a classic food 
trading concern. The family-controlled business was rapidly transformed, as a 
consequence of innovations in the processing of milk (UHT), into a dairy company, 
and thereafter quickly extended its operations into foreign and food-related markets. 
By the 1980s, the group had diversified into non-food-related markets. However, 
these ventures were unsuccessful, which eventually led to financial problems. In 
order to redress these financial problems, Coloniale restructured the group, and 
Parmlat Finanziaria, the listed holding company, emerged. 
 In the 1990s, Parmalat continued its expansion of its dairy and food services 
and diversified into tourism and the professional sports sector through the 
sponsorship of a number of domestic Italian and foreign football teams. For Parmalat, 
most of these investments were loss making from their inception. Having extended its 
reach to North and South America to more than fifty companies by the end of the 
decade, Parmalat derived most of its income internationally. Parmalat financed its 
ambitious growth expansion strategy by a combination of national and international 
debt issues and equity. 
 In 2001, Parmalat suffered financial difficulties with its operations in Latin 
America, which, if known to the market, would have led to higher costs of capital. In 
order to appear investor-friendly, Parmalat artificially enhanced its consolidated 
income statements and balance sheets while taking actions to conceal its ever-
increasing debt mountain. This led top management and officers, in turn, to 
undertake a series of paper trail transactions designed to systematically mislead 
investors regarding certain assets and liabilities. For example, Parmalat’s 
management created false documentation and bank accounts to improve their cash 
position. As part of this effort, a letter from the Bank of America was created 
confirming a €3.9 billion bank account of Bonlat Financing Corporation, a Parmalat 
subsidiary incorporated in the Cayman Islands.6 This false confirmation letter was 
used by Bonlat’s auditors to certify its 2002 financial statement. Moreover, as part of 
its fraudulent effort, Parmalat supported its 2003 offerings of unsecured notes to US 
                                                
6 In re Parmalat Securities Litigation: Master Docket 04 Civ 0030 (LAK) ECF Case, First Amended 




investors by disclosing Bonalat’s 2002 certification and its 2002 audited financial 
statement, which included references to a non-existent bank account. 
 During the years 2002 and 2003, the Parmalat Group encountered questions 
from supervisory authorities and gatekeepers about the quality of its financial 
statements and disclosures. For example, a February 2003 bond issue was 
cancelled due to concerns over debt sustainability and accounting problems. 
Subsequently the placement of private bonds in July 2003 led to regulatory pressures 
from Consob, the Italian financial regulator, when Parmalat Finanziaria’s statutory 
auditor, Deloitte, cast doubt on financial statements. On 8 December 2003, the 
Parmalat Group was unable to make payment on a bond expiry, which led Standard 
and Poors to downgrade its debt to junk status. Meanwhile, Calisto Tanzi resigned as 
CEO on 15 December after acknowledging that company records were false, which 
the Bank of America confirmed on 19 December 2003. The company filed for 
bankruptcy on 23 December and was declared insolvent on 27 December 2003.  
 In the end, between 1990 and 2003, the Parmalat Group increased its total 
debt by €13.2 billion, while generating €1 billion from operations. But it spent €5.4 
billion for unproductive acquisitions, €5.3 billion in bank charges and commissions, 
and €2.3 billion in financial diversions. From this perspective, then, the behavior of 
the Parmalat Group is immediately apparent. The expansion strategy was a costly 
failure that led to huge losses. The financial structure of the group needed to be 
expanded in order to support significant diversions of private benefits, the rapidly 
deteriorating balance sheet, and the costly arranging and borrowing fees. The 
architects of the fraud had anticipated that their strategy of foreign expansion and 
corresponding exploitation of weak foreign and Italian governance systems would 
allow them to exploit minority shareholders and creditors for a reasonably long 
period. If nothing else, the detailed investigations into Parmalat’s collapse revealed 
the extent to which inefficient controlling shareholders employed a huge variety of 
sophisticated techniques to tunnel assets, profits and corporate opportunities. For 
instance, Parmalat’s controlling family used a virtual hydra head of offshore 
subsidiaries and chains of companies to cover up their losses and prop up the 
financial situation of the group.  
 The Enron and Parmalat cases showed the need for new legal mechanisms 
to address the governance problems triggered by controlling shareholders and the 
use of chains of corporate vehicles. While there were numerous conventional legal 
strategies available to curtail management’s capacity to carry out self-dealing 
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transactions, lawmakers have strengthened regulation in the core areas of audit and 
auditors, non-executive directors, and board structure. Yet, the recent financial crisis 
seems to indicate that the legal protections and increased focus on corporate 
governance are not the whole story.  
Perhaps the most important challenge lies on the disclosure side. Arguably, 
investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an 
accurate disclosure and reporting regime that provides transparency in the beneficial 
ownership and control structures of listed companies. This is particularly true for 
corporate governance systems that are characterized by concentrated ownership.  
As we have seen, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have 
incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the 
expense of minority investors and other stakeholders. Obviously, protecting the 
interest of minority investors will be difficult without access to reliable information 
about the ownership, including the identity of the controlling owners, and control 
structures of listed companies. Still, the current debate on disclosure rules and 
regulations reveal significant differences of opinion regarding the extent to which 
stringent mandatory disclosure rules can prove effective in discouraging illicit, related 
party transactions. 
 
3. Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership 
 
3.1 Inside and outside ownership: costs and benefits 
 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policymakers and regulators are again 
concerned with designing a corporate governance framework that is better able to 
protect investors from misbehaviour and self-interested managers and controlling 
shareholders. The debate focuses on the principal-agent relationship between those 
with actual control over the company and minority investors, other stakeholders, such 
as employees, customers and suppliers, and society in general. In so-called market 
systems, which are characterized by widely dispersed, small and numerous 
shareholdings and thick, liquid trading markets, the emphasis of the discussion is 
mainly on creating mechanisms that are intended to curtail Enron-type agency 
problems between self-interested management and passive investors.7 These 
problems can largely be explained by the “vertical agency relationship” in which the 
                                                
7 See W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 745, 2001. 
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managers are the agents and the shareholders are the principals (see Figure 1). The 
agency problems in market systems stem from shareholders being passive and not 
at all engaged in monitoring and, if necessary, disciplining management. In 
economics jargon, the “separation of ownership and control” provides management 
with the opportunity to use superior information about a company’s strategies, 
policies and prospects opportunistically and self-interestedly, without the risk of being 
detected.  
 In concentrated ownership or blockholder systems, found in many variations 
in Europe, Asia and most other capitalists economies, the magnitude of the “vertical 
agency problem” is mitigated because some investors tend to have larger stakes in 
listed companies and hence have more incentives to monitor and discipline 
management. Here, one should distinguish between two types of listed firms in 
blockholder systems (see Figure 1). Firstly, there are listed companies, such as most 
institutional investor “controlled” companies, in which the substantial voting rights and 
cash-flow rights are identical and based on the proportion of total shares held. These 
investors, generally referred to as “outside blockholders”, make listed companies 
prone to a three-way conflict between controlling shareholders, managers and 
minority shareholders. Since outside blockholders usually mitigate the problems 
related to managerial opportunism, it is not surprising that policymakers and 
regulators focus on possible conflicts that may occur in the “horizontal agency 
relationship” between outside blockholders and passive minority investors.8 To see 
this, note that in the current financial world, which is typically characterized by high 
frequency trading and rapid and continuous changes in share ownership, institutional 
investors are inclined to focus too much on short-term returns.9 The short-term 
stance of outside blockholders’ investment strategy makes minority shareholders 
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour.10 For example, recent research shows that 
before the occurrence of the financial crisis was imminent, powerful institutional 
investors encouraged managers of their portfolio companies to pursue more risky 
                                                
8 See L.A. Bebchuk and R.J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, The 
Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 702, July 2011. 
9 See C. Van der Elst and E.P.M. Vermeulen, Europe’s Corporate Governance Green Paper: Do 
Institutional Investors Matter?, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics 2011-2 Working 
Paper (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860144). 
10 The legal framework of a listed company provides parties with a differentiated management and 
control structure in which shareholders elect directors and participate in certain fundamental decisions, 
and directors establish policies, select managers, perform monitoring functions, and act as the 
company’s agents. Because the controlling shareholder elects the directors, they are usually able to 
practically control the management and supervision of a listed company.  
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and opportunistic growth strategies in order to spur short-term shareholder returns.11 
The fact that outside blockholders, due to more advanced trading practices and 
technologies, increasingly use derivative instruments and short-selling techniques in 
order to make profits just adds to the “horizontal agency problem” between outside 
blockholders and minority investors.12 
 Secondly, recall the Parmalat example. Listed companies are predominantly  
family-owned - and sometimes even state-owned - companies with inside 
blockholders, who actually hold management positions or serve on the board of 
directors of the companies they invest in (see Figure 1).13 Obviously, “vertical agency 
problems” are irrelevant, but “horizontal agency problems” abound in these listed 
companies. As we have seen in the Parmalat-case, the controlling shareholders may 
employ several strategies to extract resources and assets from firms they control, 
thereby significantly increasing the horizontal agency costs. These include: (1) 
dilutive share issues, (2) insider trading, (3) withholding important information, (4) 
allocation of corporate opportunities and business activities, and (5) related party 
transactions. As the Parmalat example shows, the key concern about related party 
transactions is that they may not be undertaken at market prices, calling for strict 
disclosure and reporting regimes that provide minority investors with information 
about the blockholder’s controlling identity, interest and intentions.14 
 
3.2 The importance of “strict” disclosure and reporting mechanisms 
 There is a wide array of legal mechanisms designed to prevent or restrict 
corporate actions that may lead to opportunistic behaviour by blockholders. For 
instance, pre-emption rights in company law statutes give all shareholders in a 
company the right to be offered any newly issued shares before the shares are 
offered to either non-shareholders or one or more of the existing shareholders. 
Because the offer of new shares to existing shareholders must usually be made on a 
                                                
11 See D.H. Erkens, M. Hung and P.P. Matos, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: 
Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 249/2009. 
12 When institutional investors sell short, they sell borrowed shares under the expectation that they will 
be able to buy the shares back in the market at a lower price. 
13 See C.G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY Economic Policy 
Review, April 2003.  
14 It should be noted that related party transactions play an important and legitimate role in a market 
economy. For firms, trade and foreign investments are often facilitated by inter-company financing 
transactions. Lower costs of capital and tax savings provide a strong incentive for engaging in related 
party transactions. Indeed, there are many examples of related party transactions that yield benefits for 
companies. The most popular transactions include (1) inter-company loans or guarantees from parent to 
foreign subsidiary, (2) a leasing or service agreement between a parent and a foreign subsidiary, and 
(3) the sale of receivables to a special purpose entity. 
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pro-rata basis, this legal provision prevents that blockholders expropriate the 
interests of minority investors by initiating dilutive share issues. Another example of 
legal provisions that regulate potentially self-dealing transactions can be found in the 
listing rules of several Asian countries. The listing rules of the Hong Kong and 
Singapore stock exchanges, for instance, insist that material related party 
transactions are put to a vote by the minority shareholders of listed companies, 
providing them with information and control over expropriation attempts. 
 
Figure 1: Agency problems in blockholder systems 
  
 No matter how effective these mechanisms are, they are not by themselves a 
sufficient remedy for the legal and regulatory challenges raised by concentrated 
ownership and blockholders. Indeed, minority investors must have means to monitor 
and observe blockholders’ behaviour in order to detect possible opportunism and 
expropriation at an early stage. Therefore, the existence of an accurate disclosure 
and reporting regime that provides transparency in the ownership and control 
structures of publicly listed companies is considered as the linchpin of an effective 
corporate governance infrastructure. This conclusion is not new to policymakers and 
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regulators.15 Most jurisdictions passed legislation mandating shareholders to disclose 
and report the accumulation of a substantial ownership of shares (see Table 1). The 
reporting requirement includes the ownership of bearer shares, which is often still 
considered legal and appropriate. Bearer shares are normally not registered in a 
shareholders register, making it almost impossible to quickly determine the identity of 
the shareholders. To be sure, registration with the company is often necessary if 
holders of bearer shares intend to vote or want to receive dividends. Without effective 
disclosure and reporting requirements, however, bearer shares would enable 
shareholders to secretly acquire potential control over a listed company, thereby 
facilitating market manipulation and abusive tactics.  
 
Table 1: Disclosure thresholds across countries (2005) 
Country Threshold Country  Threshold 
Italy 2% Sweden 5% 
UK 3% Switzerland 5% 
Brazil 5% Turkey 5% 
China 5% US 5% 
France 5% Argentina 5% 
Germany 5% Russia 25% 
India 5% Canada 10% 
Japan 5% Chile 10% 
Malaysia 5% Pakistan 10% 
Netherlands 5% Latvia 10% 
Spain 5% Mexico No 
Source: Adapted from M.C. Schouten and M.M. Siems, The Evolution of Ownership 
Disclosure Rules Across Countries, 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 451 
 
 The rationale behind the disclosure requirements is clear: to alert minority 
investors to material changes in corporate control and ownership structures and to 
enable them to make an informed assessment of the effect of these changes. Still, 
there is more to be done. The effect of disclosure and reporting requirements 
                                                
15 See F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard 
University Press, 1991. 
 
12 
depends largely on the scope and definitions of ownership and control. Even if the 
use of bearer shares is abolished or restricted, there are a number of other legitimate 
ways to conceal the true identity of the ultimate beneficial owner of a company’s 
shares. The picture of ownership and control will thus still be blurred if there is no 
disclosure or reporting requirement for the “ultimate” beneficial owners to reveal their 
identity. For instance, if disclosure must only be made at the level of direct 
shareholders, the use of nominee shareholders, other intermediaries, chains of 
corporate vehicles or equity derivatives will mask the identity of investors (see Figure 
2).  
 
Figure 2: The need to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner 
 
Source: Adapted from D. Zetzsche, Continental vs. Schaeffler, Hidden Ownership 
and European Law - A Matter of Law or Enforcement?, Heinrich-Heine-University 
Duesseldorf, Faculty of Law, Center for Business and Corporate Law Research 





3.2.1 Nominee and omnibus accounts 
 In practice, a nominee shareholder is typically a company created for the 
purpose of holding shares and other securities on behalf of investors. They hold the 
shares on trust for one or more beneficial owners, and often only they are identified 
on the register of shareholders. Usually, foreign investors have to open single-client 
nominee accounts because their global account provider is not permitted to 
participate directly in a local Central Securities Depository (CSD). The concern for 
regulators is clear: the appointment of nominee shareholders would, in effect, provide 
beneficial owners with the opportunity to shield their identity from investors and other 
stakeholders, making it more difficult to detect expropriation by controlling beneficial 
owners.  
 Likewise, policy makers and regulators increasingly express concerns about 
omnibus accounts. An omnibus account is a securities account that involves many 
investors. Although the account is opened in the name of the account provider, it 
should be viewed as an umbrella which covers a large number of individual accounts. 
Omnibus accounts seriously reduce transaction costs that are due to clearing and 
settlement fees and procedures. However, because the breakdown behind the 
omnibus accounts is often hidden for the listed companies and their investors, they 




 Recently, cash-settled equity derivatives and related techniques are used to 
obtain effective control of the underlying shares without the need for disclosure under 
the transparency and disclosure regimes. To see this, consider the following 
transaction: an investor (also called holder of the long position) purchases and 
acquires from a derivatives dealer or bank (the holder of the short position) a long 
cash-settled swap covering the underlying shares in a listed company. Under the 
agreement between the holder of the long position and the holder of the short 
position, the investor benefits from price increases in the underlying shares and 
incurs losses if the price decreases. The derivatives dealer usually assumes a 
neutral risk position by physically acquiring the underlying shares at the strike price of 
the derivative. The swap arrangement thus results in a decoupling of the voting rights 
from the beneficial ownership of the shares. The decoupling leads to “hidden 
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ownership” and could also result in “empty voting” issues.16 Hidden ownership refers 
to the situation where a cash-settled equity derivative gives the investor a long 
position in the shares of a listed company that remains undisclosed until the investor 
physically acquires the shares or the settlement arrangement is formally changed 
from a cash settlement to a physical settlement. Empty voting occurs when the 
derivatives broker votes the shares as directed by the investor. 
 
3.2.3 Control enhancing mechanisms 
 Investors often employ complex control and ownership arrangements 
designed to give them voting/control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. These 
arrangements are commonly employed by inside blockholders who usually have 
voting control, even if they ostensibly have no majority stake in the company. Voting 
rights can, for instance, be separated from cash flow rights by setting up pyramid or 
cross-shareholding structures, issuing multiple voting rights shares, and participating 
in shareholder coalitions. Ownership pyramids or cascades are the most widely used 
mechanism to accumulate control power with a relatively limited investment in most 
countries in the world. For instance, Table 2 shows that pyramid structures prevail in 
Europe. They enable a shareholder to maintain control through multiple layers of 
ownership while at the same time sharing the investment with other (minority) 
shareholders at each intermediate ownership tier. Pyramid structures reduce the 
liquidity constraints of large shareholders while it allows those shareholders to retain 
substantial voting power. 
 In a similar vein, the issuance of multiple voting rights shares provides 
shareholders with control in excess of their share ownership. The separation of 
beneficial ownership from control rights (or voting rights) results in significant private 
benefits beyond the usual financial return on the shares. The negative effect of 
concentrated ownership is reflected in the size of the control premium. This is the 
difference between the market value of shares, and how much someone is willing to 
pay for those shares if they confer (or maintain) control over a company. The 
existence of a control premium reflects the gains that majority shareholders can 
make at the expense of minority shareholders. The size of the control premium 
depends on a number of factors, including the competition in the market for corporate 
                                                
16 See H.T.C. Hu and B. Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, 
Implications, and Reforms, 61 Business Lawyer 1011, 2006; E.S. De Nardis and M. Tonello, Know Your 
Shareholder: The Use of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives to Hide Corporate Ownership Interests 
Conference Board Director Notes No. DN-009, July 2010. 
 
15 
control, the size of the block sold, the distribution of shares in the target firm, the 
inequality of voting power, the nationality of the buyer, and the financial condition of 
the firm involved. The existence of large private benefits of control suggests that 
blockholders may be able to obtain a large share of the rents. For instance, the 
holder of multiple voting rights shares is usually allowed a seat on the board of 
directors and will thus receive non-public information on the company’s cost structure 
and performance. 
 
Table 2: Control Enhancing Mechanisms in Europe 
Control Enhancing 
Mechanisms 
Availability Actual Use 
Pyramid structure 100% 75% 
Shareholders agreement 100% 69% 
Cross-shareholdings 100% 31% 
Supermajority provisions 87% N/A 
Multiple voting rights shares 50% 44% 
Source: Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, External 
Study Commissioned by the European Commission 2006. 
   
 Control enhancing mechanisms are prone to severe agency problems, which 
support calls for improvements in the corporate governance infrastructure of most 
countries. The question is what type of legal rules and other regulatory strategies will 
best serve the infrastructure’s goal of limiting the effects of self-interested 
transactions involving controlling shareholders. In response to the weaknesses of a 
corporate governance infrastructure, policymakers could address the agency 
problems by either banning control enhancing mechanisms or by providing increased 
transparency and disclosure. The first option, however, may have some detrimental 
effects on the innovative and entrepreneurial potential of fast-growing listed 
companies,17 making disclosure and reporting requirements for control enhancing 
mechanisms the preferred option. 
                                                
17 For instance, Google, Inc., a Delaware corporation, decided to extend the “Google way” of doing 
business to its corporate governance structure. At some point in time, the Google founders and its Chief 
Executive Officer owned approximately 90 percent of the outstanding class B shares, giving them 68% 
of the firm’s total voting rights while their economic interest was only approximately 20% (making them 
inside blockholders). The multiple voting rights shares did not seem to withhold investors to buy class A 
Google shares. In fact, these investors could actually consider Google’s multiple voting rights share 
structure as good practice during the growth and development stage of the listed company, because it 
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3.2.4 Chains of corporate vehicles 
 Chains of corporate vehicles could also be used by controlling beneficial 
owners to conceal their true identity and set up complex ownership structures and 
arrangements in listed companies. To be sure, companies may have legitimate or 
clear economic motives to use chains of corporate vehicles. However, the use of a 
chain of local and offshore corporate vehicles or international holding structures is 
sometimes an indication that controlling beneficial owners engage in abusive and 
opportunistic behaviour. Whilst misuse of corporate vehicles is often difficult to 
discover, it is acknowledged that (potential) misuse of corporate vehicles can be 
limited by the maintenance and sharing of information on beneficial ownership and 
control  in the corporate vehicle through a number of legal and regulatory measures. 
These measures include: (1) an up-front beneficial ownership disclosure to the public 
authorities and official intermediaries, (2) mandating private corporate service 
providers to maintain beneficial ownership information, and (3) primary reliance on an 
investigative system. In the Section 5 of this essay, we discuss the mechanisms to 
hide the identity of the beneficial owners of corporate vehicles in more detail. More 
importantly, we critically assess the ability of anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorism rules to provide transparency in the area of ownership and control in listed 
companies, thereby protecting minority investors in general. 
 
3.3 Beneficial ownership and control: the challenges 
 The difficulties involved in tracing ultimate beneficial ownership and, more 
importantly, control make it onerous for minority investors and other stakeholders to 
discover and curtail self-dealing, such as asset stripping, related party transactions 
and share dilutions by the ultimate controlling beneficial owners. Not surprisingly, the 
recent financial crisis calls for stricter disclosure and reporting rules that help uncover 
the complicated control structures used by ultimate beneficial owners of listed 
companies. On March 7, 2011, for instance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of the United States received a petition for rulemaking submitted 
by a law firm recommending amendments to the regulatory provisions that govern 
disclosures required by persons who “beneficially own” more than five percent of a 
                                                                                                                                      
gives controlling shareholders (the founders) an incentive to monitor the firm closely and exposes the 
founders personally to the firm’s public shareholders and other stakeholders. The fact that Google 
ranked high on the Financial Times Global 500 largest companies in 2010 seems to indicate that the 
control enhancing mechanisms do not necessarily have a detrimental effect on firm value. 
 
17 
class of equity securities of a publicly listed company.18 The petition specifically 
requests that the time period within which beneficial ownership reports must be filed 
with the SEC be shortened pursuant to new statutory authority provided in Section 
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The petition also asks the SEC to 
broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to include ownership interests held by 
persons who use derivative instruments. The proposed amendment would ensure 
that investors have information about all persons who have the potential to change or 
influence control of the issuer.  
 There is something to the call for stricter disclosure and reporting rules and 
regulations. Investors fare better in a corporate governance environment that allows 
beneficial owners to acquire control either directly or indirectly through derivatives or 
chains of corporate vehicles (if this meets a company’s specific governance needs 
and requirements) than in a system that prohibits beneficial market activity.19 In order 
to protect minority investors, policymakers and legislatures should therefore consider 
the introduction of clear and stringent disclosure and transparency obligations that 
offer minority investors a true picture of ownership and control structures and, more 
importantly, reveal the identity of the persons who should be considered as the 
ultimate beneficial owner.  
 Indeed, a good corporate governance infrastructure should ideally combine 
large investor involvement with legal protection of minority investors. Obviously, 
minority investor protection will be challenging without access to reliable information 
about the ownership, including the identity of the controlling owners, and control 
structures of listed companies. However, despite clear benefits, a disclosure and 
reporting regime has its costs as well. A recent analysis cast doubt on whether the 
rules in the United States should be tightened.20 Firstly, it is argued that empirical 
research has shown that controlling beneficial owners provide benefits to other 
shareholders “by making incumbent directors and managers more accountable, 
thereby reducing agency costs and managerial slack.” Secondly, tighter disclosure 
rules could seriously decrease blockholders’ incentives to engage in monitoring. For 
instance, outside blockholders’ monitoring and disciplining activities can be explained 
by a listed company’s stock price not reflecting the company’s potential. A (too) strict 
                                                
18 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission - Petition for 
Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 March 2011. 
19 See also M. Kettunen and W-G Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity derivatives - An 
Intentions-Based Approach, University of Oxford, Legal Research Paper Series, July 2011 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886). 
20 See L.A. Bebchuk and R.J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, The 
Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 702, July 2011. 
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and disproportional disclosure and reporting regime that obliges a blockholder to 
disclose its position at a very early stage without being able to benefit more from 
relatively low stock prices, would arguably discourage them to engage in monitoring, 
thereby increasing “vertical agency costs”. Indeed, public information about the 
presence of outside blockholders will have a price increasing effect on a listed 
company’s stock price and, as a consequence, reduce the incidence and size of 
outside blocks. Thirdly, it is not certain that the current trading technologies and 
practices, such as cash settled derivatives, have led to increased accumulations of 
ownership. Fourthly, strict disclosure regimes tilt the playing field against 
blockholders monitoring activities. Indeed, a disclosure and reporting regime could 
target several types of beneficial owners: (1) passive beneficial owners who are only 
interested in a company’s share price, (2) beneficial owners who monitor the 
performance of listed companies and initiate dialogues with management, and (3) 
beneficial owners that seek to acquire control over a listed company. Clearly, the 
market is particularly interested in the third category of beneficial owners. Targeting 
the whole range of beneficial owners could discourage legitimate blockholders’ 
activities. Finally, is is argued that tightening the disclosure regime cannot be justified 
on the grounds that it is needed to protect minority investors. A stringent disclosure 
and reporting regime could lead to information overload. Stricter disclosure and 
reporting requirements that increase the complexity and quantity of information in the 
financial market, make it more difficult for minority investors to make informed and 
considered choices regarding their investments. This is especially true if rules and 
regulations endeavour to target ownership through complex derivatives 
arrangements even if the “owner” does not seek control.21 
 It follows from the above discussion that the design of a balanced and 
effective disclosure and reporting regime into a country’s corporate governance 
framework poses something of a challenge. Who - and at which shareholders level - 
should report a stake in a listed company? When should the disclosure be made and 
to whom? What should be disclosed? Through which channels should beneficial 
ownership and control be reported? Who will have access to the reported 
information? Arguably, countries need a proportionate and flexible reporting and 
disclosure regime to combine the best of two “worlds”: protection against 
opportunistic (inside) blockholders without creating disincentives for (outside) 
blockholders to intervene in badly managed companies (see Table 3). Obviously, in 
                                                
21 See M.K. Brunnermeier and M. Oehmke, Complexity in Financial Market, Working Paper, 2009. 
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order to have practical relevance, the disclosure and reporting requirements for 
beneficial owners should be complemented with effective rules that directly target  
intra company transfers and other related party transactions. 
 
Table 3: Beneficial Ownership and Control: The Challenges for Policy Makers and 
Regulators  
Outside blockholders Inside blockholders 
The good: Outside blockholders have an 
incentive to improve management by making 
incumbent directors and managers more 
accountable and thereby reducing agency 
costs and managerial slack. 
The Good: Inside blockholders tend to 
overcome underinvestment problems. 
Moreover, fast-growing and innovative listed 
companies tend to benefit from the presence 
of inside blockholders. 
The Bad: Outside blockholders could decide 
to pursue short-term opportunistic activities. 
The Bad: Inside blockholders have a strong 
incentive to reap private benefits of control 
through self-dealing and insider trading. 
The disclosure regime should not be too 
stringent. Outside blockholders invest in 
monitoring in their belief that the actual (low) 
share price does not reflect the true value of 
the company. Empirical research shows that 
their monitoring activities protect minority 
investors against managerial slack. The share 
price will increase dramatically when the 
presence of outside blockholders is disclosed. 
This has a negative effect on the incentives of 
the blockholders to buy additional shares to 
increase their stake, preventing them from 
becoming a stronger blockholder and 
reducing their expected returns. 
The disclosure regime should be stringent 
and demanding. Inside blockholders have an 
incentive to protect their private benefits of 
control at the expense of minority investors. 
Source: Adapted from L.A. Bebchuk and R.J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics 
of Blockholder Disclosure, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, 
Discussion Paper No. 702, July 2011; X. Chen and J. Yur-Austin, Re-measuring 
agency costs: The effectiveness of blockholders, 47 The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance 588, 2007; A. Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in 
Securities Regulation Around the World, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for 




4. Related Party Transactions 
 
 As noted above, the Enron and Parmalat scandals illustrate the difficulty that 
auditors and regulators face in identifying related party relationships and transactions 
that are motivated by fraud or illicit earnings management. While there is widespread 
agreement on the need to regulate related party transactions, there is much less 
convergence on what transactions should be subject to deterrent regulation. 
 
4.1 Why should one care about related party transactions? 
 The received wisdom is that related party transactions play an important and 
legitimate role in a market economy. For firms, trade and foreign investment is often 
facilitated by inter-company financing transactions. Lower costs of capital and tax 
savings provide a strong incentive for engaging in these transactions. Indeed, there 
are many examples of related party transactions that yield benefits for companies. By 
far the most popular transactions include (1) inter-company loans or guarantees from 
parent to foreign subsidiary; (2) the sale of receivables to a special purpose entity, 
and (3) a leasing or licensing agreement between a parent and a foreign subsidiary. 
A key concern about related party transactions is that they might not be undertaken 
at market prices but can be influenced by the relationship between the two sides of a 
transaction: there is a conflict of interest for some person in the company. For both 
inside blockholders and other insiders such as management, related party 
transactions can be the mechanism for extracting private benefits of control at the 
cost of other shareholders. There are a broad array of legal strategies to regulate 
disclosure of related party transactions and conflicts of interests.  
 A large body of literature has considered these issues by referring to the 
American experience with conflicted transactions by management and controlling 
shareholders. It is important to recognize that US law once prohibited interested 
transactions involving managers and directors. But the strategy for prohibiting self-
dealing transactions underscores a particular political-legal tradition rather than a 
credible means to protect private investors and foster a more equitable distribution of 
wealth in society. Accordingly, the prohibition strategy failed to deter reallocations of 
wealth. In fact, aside from providing little protection against a single undetected 
transaction, the prohibition of self-dealing may have left many companies worse off 
as a consequence of preventing many efficient transactions. 
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 This prompted the need for regulators to allow companies to pursue certain 
related party transactions not leading to conflicts of interest. The shift in self-dealing 
rules reflected the view that some non-abusive transactions are valuable and that 
parties should have incentives to pursue these transactions. US company law rules 
provide that self-dealing transactions are permitted subject to legal controls. To 
protect outside investors from abusive transactions, state and federal laws regulate 
self-dealing, corporate opportunities, insider trading, and the compensation 
agreements with executives. 
 However, there are suggestions that the modern regulation of self-dealing 
transactions is misguided. Thus, where managerial value diversion does not raise 
fairness and distributional concerns, there is no obvious need to protect shareholders 
against expropriation. Moreover, to the extent that value diversion is an alternative 
form of compensation, it probably makes little sense to subject conflicted transactions 
to restrictive legal rules.  
 Another approach, inspired in part by these views, stresses that the benign 
view of value diversion is misleading. Managerial value diversion creates significant 
agency costs by eviscerating the incentive effects of performance-based pay. To be 
sure, there is evidence that extra-legal mechanisms, such as trust and loss of 
reputation, can lessen but not eliminate the inefficient subtraction of firm earnings. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, if the gains of opportunism are very large, legal 
standards may be insufficient to limit management from engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour. This is an argument for encouraging more protective measures of minority 
investors, increased transparency, and stronger shareholder involvement in 
decisions involving transactions that could implicate a conflict of interest with 
management or a controlling shareholder. 
 While there is little agreement on the rationale to regulate related party 
transactions, there is even much less consensus on what transactions should be 
subject to deterrent regulation. To be sure, the nature of the problem varies: in 
companies with controlling shareholders and with corporate groups, the measures 
need to be different from those situations where ownership is spread and where the 
board and management is effectively entrenched. 
 
4.2 Identifying related party transactions: the challenges 
 Various terminology and definitions are employed to define related parties 
and related party transactions across jurisdictions. In the US, the Financial 
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Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) Statement no 57 provides that related party 
transactions involve transactions between a parent company and subsidiary; 
subsidiaries of a common parent; an enterprise and trusts for the benefit of 
employees; an enterprise and its principal owners, management, or members of their 
immediate families; and affiliates.22 It is unlikely, however, that there is a simple 
definition that is sufficient for identifying all the transactions with related parties. A 
second ground for eliminating this approach is that certain complex transactions, 
which fail to meet the relevant criteria, may be too easily excluded on these grounds. 
Ruling out this approach is an important step for developing a basis to identify these 
transactions. 
 Seen in this light, the attempt to identify related party transactions raises 
complex issues. That said, the nature of related party transactions is best highlighted 
by general principles such as those of the International Accounting Standards Board 
rather than listing categories of people and entities. According to IAS 24, parties are 
considered to be related if one party has the ability to control the other party or 
exercise significant influence over the other party in making financial and operating 
decisions. Related party transactions are defined as a transfer of resources or 
obligations between related parties, regardless of whether or not a market price is 
charged. The OECD Principles take a similar approach and state that related parties 
can include entities that control or are under common control with the company, 
board members, and significant shareholders, including members of families and key 
management personnel. 
 Transactions involving major shareholders or their close family either directly 
or indirectly are potentially the most difficult types of transactions to identify. Again, 
the Enron and Parmalat scandals illustrate the difficulty that regulators face 
identifying related party relationships and transactions that are motivated by fraud. 
The complications arise not only from the complexity of many of these transactions, 
but also involve auditors’ problems of detecting material misstatements in financial 
statements due to a related party transaction.  
 There is no question that the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ (AICPA) Statement of Auditing Standard no 45, AU Sec 334 (2001) has 
supplied a feasible approach for identifying material transactions, such as interest-
free borrowing, asset sales that diverge from appraisal value, in-kind transactions, 
and loans made without scheduled terms. Other indicators can be used as well to 
                                                
22  FASB Statement no 57 Related Party Disclosures. 
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detect potential opportunism. One possibility is to have auditors obtain information 
about management responsibilities to run the company, controls over management 
activities, and management arrangements with various components of the entity. At 
the same time, AU Sec 334 can be used to identify the existence of related party 
transactions. Company auditors can employ a range of audit procedures, from the 
review of non-recurring transactions to the invoices of regular services, to evaluate 
conflicted transactions. 
 There is satisfactory transparency regarding related party transactions for all 
listed companies with the European Union under IAS 24 and under the national 
codes. In terms of disclosure of related party transactions, regardless of whether 
there have been transactions between a parent and a subsidiary, an entity must 
disclose the name of its parent and, if different, the ultimate controlling party. If 
neither the entity's parent nor the ultimate controlling party produces financial 
statements available for public use, the name of the next most senior parent that 
does so must also be disclosed (see IAS 24.12). Furthermore, IAS 24 mandates that 
for each category of related parties, companies should disclose the nature of the 
related party relationship as well as information about the transactions and 
outstanding balances necessary for an understanding of the potential effect of the 
relationship on the financial statements (see IAS 17-18). Such disclosure should 
include the amount of the transactions, the amount of outstanding balances, 
provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of outstanding balances, and 
expenses recognized during the period in respect of bad or doubtful debts due from 
related parties. 
 Nevertheless, there are numerous techniques that parties use to avoid the 
IAS 24. As we have seen earlier, the controlling shareholder is able to obtain non-
public information and use it for personal financial benefit or tip other family members 
– who might then make an investment decision on the basis of the information. The 
inaccuracy of public information is less pressing if a minority shareholder is also a 
director in a company. In that case, he will be able to influence and monitor 
management decisions directly. Legally requiring shareholder approval may have the 
same effect. However, if minority shareholders are not in a managerial capacity or 
involved in the decision-making process, they are unlikely to gather the information 
without relying on a legal mandate.  
 Thus, even though enhanced financial statement transparency should be 
encouraged, regulators must not underestimate the higher costs of disclosure for 
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those non-listed companies. If the idea is to increase the accountability of  
companies, regulators may need to subject disclosure of related party transactions 
on an aggregate basis. 
 
5. Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership of Corporate Vehicles 
 
 Off balance sheet corporate vehicles played an important role in the Enron 
scandal and the built-up to Parmalat’s troubles. In this context, it is important to 
evaluate their purpose and their multitude of uses in financial transactions. Indeed, 
modern corporate vehicles are diverse and serve a range of complex needs for 
business parties. At their core, they allow business people to carry out important 
commercial activities. Organizing these activities through corporate vehicles solves a 
number of contracting problems while contributing to the development of a 
sophisticated and complex economic environment. The flexibility and adaptability of 
corporate vehicles to accommodate the financial and organizational needs of 
entrepreneurs and investors have arguably contributed to the deepening of financial 
markets. Irrespective of how effective these forms might be for meeting the needs of 
a broad range of businesses and investors, there have been increasing concerns 
about the degree to which these forms are used for tax evasion, money laundering, 
and other illegal or abusive transactions. The financial market and banking systems 
become more international and, in important respects, encourage the development of 
financial centers. As these centers become more established and accessible, an 
increasing number of individuals, businesses and opportunistic investors are likely to 
take advantage of the usually flexible regulation and gate-keeping systems in these 
centers. 
 For instance, it is clear that offshore financial centers are not only attractive 
due to the flexible financial supervision, bank secrecy laws and beneficial fiscal 
treatment, but equally due to their usually accessible rules regarding the formation 
and operation of corporate vehicle.23 It is a common refrain that controlling beneficial 
owners of company shares frequently involve the use of offshore corporate vehicles 
or international holding structures to conceal the true identity of the shareholders. In 
fact, some of the major offshore jurisdictions have encouraged investors to move 
capital and use their financial institutions by creating legislation that effectively restrict 
the identity of the beneficial owners of the company. Along with the instruments for 
                                                
23 See OECD, Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes, 2001. 
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achieving anonymity, there are also a variety of legal measures, such as restrictions 
on gatekeepers and service providers to assist regulators with determining the true 
identity of parties, that also allow money launders and others pursuing criminal 
schemes to invest with minimal scrutiny. 
 As we have seen, there are a number of techniques that make it difficult to 
establish the true ownership of a company, such as bearer shares and nominee 
shareholders. Modern corporate vehicles,24 which are even less regulated than the 
traditional corporate form for listed companies, are even more apt for establishing 
chains of corporate vehicles. Lighter rules and regulation provide these entities with a 
more flexible structure. They can be established cheaply and often online within 24 
hours. These characteristics make these types of business forms more vulnerable to 
misuse for illicit purposes. More importantly in the context of this essay, controlling 
beneficial owners of listed companies could take advantage of the light regulation of 
these modern business forms to hide their identity and perpetrate a wide range of 
illegal or abusive activities. We already noted that inside blockholders often hide their 
identity by establishing a chain of local and offshore corporate vehicles. 
 This next Section begins with a review of the legitimate aims of corporate 
vehicles and their potential for misuse by parties to engage in illicit activities. We 
describe and analyze the competing methods for identifying beneficial ownership and 
control. The primary objective of this Section is to assess whether the disclosure 
regime for corporate vehicles can be used as an investigative tool for minority 
investors and other stakeholders to obtain information about the beneficial ownership 
and control structures, including the identity of beneficial owners, of listed companies. 
 
5.1 Corporate vehicles and their potential for misuse 
 There are many of techniques available to move money swiftly and effectively 
to evade tax authorities and other enforcement officials. Specialists on financial crime 
and money laundering frequently note that perpetrators seek to avoid detection by 
creating a chain of company law vehicles in separate jurisdictions. Corporations, 
trusts, foundations, limited partnerships and now hybrid business forms, such as the 
limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs), are the 
vehicles most commonly associated with misuse. These corporate vehicles are 
                                                
24 See F.R. Reyes and E.P.M. Vermeulen, Company Law. Lawyers and Innovation: Common Law 
versus Civil Law, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics 2011-3 Working Paper (available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907894). See also J.A. McCahery, E.P.M. Vermeulen, M. Hisatake and J. 
Saito, Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal reform: ‘the New Company Law’, 8 European 
Business Organization Law Review 7, 2007. 
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relatively simple and cost efficient to set up. For example, an offshore company acts 
as nominee for an offshore principal. In this construction, the nominee company 
represents the offshore company, and transacts all the contracts and conducts the 
business on its behalf, including invoicing and accounting. The advantages are clear, 
namely no invoices or other papers will appear in the file of the offshore principal. 
Such a construction, moreover, assumes that the nominee company will not trade in 
its country of incorporation, buy or sell goods in its own name, and sign contracts 
with the nominee company outside its home jurisdiction. In order to develop the 
chain, parties will go on to establish companies in a third jurisdiction and so forth. To 
be sure, setting up a chain of corporate vehicles is usually a cost-effective solution 
for multinationals in their efforts to establish corporate structures that help optimize 
the financial results of the group of companies. However, the anonymity created by 
these structures serves to benefit those involved in criminal activities. In this context, 
jurisdictions have moved to introduce measures that make information about the 
beneficial owners that control these chains of companies more readily available. 
 The OECD (2001), which is concerned to combat corruption and money 
laundering, has articulated a number of policy objectives in respect of preventing the 
misuse of corporate vehicles. The emphasis on restricting their misuse is in line with 
other international initiatives that seek to establish the appropriate standards to assist 
authorities and financial institutions that could effectively stem cross-border crime. As 
far as jurisdictions have mechanisms that make it possible to obtain access to 
beneficial ownership information, it is emphasized that proper oversight and high 
integrity of the system is necessary to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the 
information. It is submitted that the misuse of legal entities can be limited by the 
maintenance and sharing of information on beneficial ownership and control through 
a number of mechanisms. These alternative mechanisms include: (1) an up-front 
disclosure system;25 (2) mandating corporate service providers to maintain beneficial 
ownership information;26 and (3) primary reliance on an investigative system.27 Table 
                                                
25 An up-front disclosure system requires the disclosure of the beneficial ownership and control of 
corporate entities to the authorities, chambers of commerce or any other institutions charged with 
responsibility at the establishment or incorporation stage and imposes an obligation to update such 
information on a timely basis when changes occur. The obligation to report beneficial ownership and 
control information to the authorities may be placed on the corporate entity, the ultimate beneficial 
owner, or the corporate service provider involved in the establishment or management of the corporate 
entity. 
26 In some jurisdictions, intermediaries involved in the establishment and management of corporate 
entities, such as company formation agents, trust companies, registered agents, lawyers, notaries, 
trustees, and companies supplying nominee shareholders, directors, and officers (“corporate service 
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4 provides a “balance sheet” overview of the costs and benefits of each of these 
mechanisms. 
 
Table 4: OECD options for obtaining beneficial ownership information 
Option Benefits Costs 
Upfront disclosure • improved transparency 
• beneficial ownership and 
control information 
available at all times 
• strong deterrent effect 
• imposes significant costs 




The holding of information 
by intermediaries 
• implementation is cheap • costly and time-consuming 
for companies (particularly 
when foreign parties are 
involved) 
• the client identification and 
verification rules, and 
related recordkeeping 
requirements, represent a 
potentially costly and 
cumbersome set of 
identification practices. 
• potential for delays in the 
provision of information ex 
post  
Investigative system • may avoid unnecessary 
costs and burdens on 
business vehicles, which 
may stifle legitimate 
business formations 
• maintain a reasonable 
balance between ensuring 
proper monitoring / 
regulation of business 
vehicles and protecting 
legitimate privacy interests 
• potential for delays in the 
provision of information 
 
 
 The OECD approach is based on the premise that the most effective 
technique to identify the beneficial owner is to, when necessary, pierce through the 
legal form of corporate vehicles in order to obtain information about the legal owner 
of the shares or the party that exercises effective control over the vehicle. The 
                                                                                                                                      
providers”), are required to obtain, verify, and retain records on the (beneficial) ownership and control of 
the corporate entities that they establish, administer, or for which they provide fiduciary services. 
27 Under an investigative system, the authorities seek to obtain (through compulsory powers, court-
issued subpoenas, and other measures) beneficial ownership and control information when illicit activity 
is suspected, when such information is required by authorities to fulfill their regulatory/supervisory 
functions, or when such information is requested by other authorities domestically and internationally for 
regulatory/supervisory or law enforcement purposes. 
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argument for pursuing this strategy is largely pragmatic, namely there are an array of 
effective legal techniques available that permit regulators and other parties to obtain 
such information. The supervisory authorities, in some markets, subject financial 
intermediaries involved in the creation of such corporate vehicles to obtain a written 
declaration of the identity of the beneficial owner and renew verification of the identity 
of the contracting party or beneficial owner when changes occur during the operation 
of the business. Not only must financial intermediaries obtain the identification of the 
beneficial owner, but are bound to establish documents, make the information 
available to supervisors and retain the information long after the business 
relationship has ended. At a fundamental level, we see that the misuse of corporate 
vehicles can be controlled by a combination of mechanisms. Thus the choice 
between the particular mechanisms will be influenced by the efficacy of the legal 
system and the enforcement history and level of cross-border cooperation in the 
market. Differences in the legal traditions and culture will arguably complicate the 
exchange of information on an international level. In principle, the solution to the 
problem of disclosure of beneficial ownership appears to be straightforward: (1) 
Introduce a strong national up-front disclosure system and investigative system and 
(2) establish international collaborations to facilitate the cross-border exchange of 
information among regulators. As we will see in the next Section the elements of a 
sound system of disclosure of beneficial ownership are well known by policymakers. 
 
5.2 An Example: combating illicit use of corporate vehicles in Europe 
 Over the last decade or so, the European Union, has undertaken to 
implement uniform rules in order to curb the misuse of financial centers by criminal 
organizations and to contain money laundering. Money laundering is defined as the 
process by which a party conceals the illegal existence, illegal source or illegal 
application of income and then disguises it in order to make it appear legitimate. 
Money laundering typically involves a three-step process: placement, layering and 
integration. There is little disagreement about the steps needed to minimize the 
incidence of money laundering. However, because money laundering involves 
numerous forms of corruption, it is difficult to identify, let alone prosecute 
successfully. Given the harm that money laundering causes to financial markets and 
the effect that it has in undermining confidence in government and public officials, it 
is argued that strengthening the weak links in regulation is needed. Particularly, 
financial intermediaries, who usually have knowledge of the assets implicated in 
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these transactions and a relationship with the persons that operate the corporate 
vehicles connected to these illicit activities, play a pivotal role. 
 In 2005, the European Commission embraced the Third Directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, which had to be implemented by 15 December 2007.28 This 
Directive builds on existing EU legislation and incorporates the June 2003 revision of 
the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It repealed 
and replaced the 1991 Directive,29 as amended in 2001, with the difference that it 
introduces additional requirements and safeguards for situations of higher risks, such 
as trading with banks located outside the European Union. In the context of the 
formation and operation of corporate vehicles, the Directive not only applies to 
financial services providers, such as auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, 
but also to legal professionals when they assist their clients in the creation, operation 
or management of trusts, companies or similar structures. For instance, legal 
professionals must engage in continuous due diligence activities throughout the 
course of their relationship with clients to (1) identify their clients and, more 
importantly, verify their identity on the basis of information obtained from a reliable 
source, (2) identify the beneficial owner of a client who is a legal person, trust or 
similar legal structure, (3) understand the ownership and control structure of the 
corporate client, and (4) report suspicious transactions to the national financial 
intelligence unit (FIU).  
 The due diligence and reporting obligations present challenges for legal 
professionals at two levels.30 Firstly, the “know your client” rules and requirements 
represent potentially costly and cumbersome due diligence activities. Secondly, and 
more worrisome, tensions arise between “transparency” (i.e., the reporting obligation 
of legal professionals that detect or suspect illicit use of corporate vehicles) and 
“secrecy” (i.e., client confidentiality and lawyer-client privilege).31 These tensions 
made it necessary for FATF to draft and develop principles for legal professionals 
that help combat money laundering and terrorist financing without undermining the 
lawyer-client privilege, the duty of client confidentiality or otherwise impeding the 
delivery of legal services generally. This led in 2008 to the introduction of the 
                                                
28 See Directive 2005/60/EC. 
29 See Directive 91/308/EEC. 
30 See P.D. Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and Regulation of 
the Legal Profession, 2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 165. 
31 See C. Tyre, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations in the European Union, 2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 69. 
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Financial Action Task Force RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals (Lawyer 
Guidance). The 2008 Lawyer Guidance applies to legal professionals who engage in 
one of the five designated activities (e.g., those who help clients who buy or sell real 
estate; help create, manage or operate legal persons; or establish or manage trusts 
or hold client’s money).32 The document was well received by the legal profession in 
that it adopted a risk-based approach (as opposed to the more detailed rules-based 
approach). A risk-based approach acknowledges that there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
solution to the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Instead, it 
is founded on the premise that there are finite resources to detect and sanction 
money laundering and terrorism finance activities. The upshot is that the greatest 
risks should receive the most attention. For legal professionals, this means that they 
should focus on their client’s location, the nature of their business and the nature of 
the services requested when assessing whether they are engaged in money 
laundering or other illicit transactions. Unfortunately, it is too early to assess whether 
the 2008 Lawyer Guidance generated the coveted effect. It is clear, however, that 
differences in legal cultures and systems hamper the speedy implementation and 
development of the 2008 Lawyer Guidance. The Guidance explicitly states that the 
scope of the terms “legal professional privilege” and “professional secrecy” should be 
determined by the respective countries. Since these terms have different 
connotations in different legal cultures, the Lawyer Guidance has not (yet) been able 
to create a level-playing field for legal services in international transactions.33  
 
5.3  Combating illicit use of corporate vehicles: the challenges 
 In order to obtain information about beneficial ownership and control 
structures of listed companies, we discussed three possible disclosure systems for 
obtaining extensive disclosure information about the chain of corporate vehicles that 
are often employed by beneficial owners to conceal their identity and intentions. 
There is clear evidence of an association between the ability to obscure the identity 
of beneficial owners and the use of corporate vehicles to carry out illegal activities. 
                                                
32 See L.S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, 
2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 3. 
33 See L.L. Hill, The Financial Action Task Force Guidance for Legal Professionals: Missed 
Opportunities to Level the Playing Field, 2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 151; E.S. Podgor, 
Regulating Lawyers: Same Theme, New Context, 2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 191. For 
instance, even though it is acknowledged that professional service providers have to know the identity of 
their clients (especially in the context of complex cross-border structures), it was recently pointed out 
that it is extremely difficult to obtain information regarding foreign clients. See European Commission, 
Meeting with EU Private Stakeholders on Anti-Money laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Policy, 
17 February 2011. 
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The incidence of illegal activities, such as money laundering and terrorist financing, 
carried out through corporate vehicles suggest that this type of problem cannot be 
ignored and may require a comprehensive solution. However, it is clear that there 
may not be one efficient solution and that the appropriate system for a particular 
country may change over time to conform to local conditions and company law 
traditions. 
 In this context, it is interesting to note that recently US Senators Levin and 
Grassley started a lobby for the introduction of the “Incorporation Transparency and 
Law Enforcement Assistance Act”. Under this proposal, the incorporation of 
corporate vehicles in the United States would require the collection and retention of 
identity information for beneficial owners (names, addresses, driver’s license or 
passport number) of corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs) which are not 
publicly traded or regulated. Moreover, the beneficial ownership information would be 
subject to subpoena by law enforcement. Despite the fact that promulgation of the 
Act would lead to a significant increase of the costs of incorporating in the United 
States, the Senators are of the opinion that the identification procedures will have a 
positive impact on the prevention of money-laundering and illicit use of legal vehicles.  
 In practice, however, the upfront identification of a client (either by public 
agents or intermediaries) who wants to set up a corporate vehicle is not without 
difficulties. To give just one example, the identification of residents of foreign 
countries could severely hamper and delay the formation process. Besides the 
cultural resistance of some countries to deliver supporting evidence for their 
residents’ identification, clients often provide incorrect or uncertified copies of 
supporting documents, which increases the transaction costs regarding the formation 
and operation of corporate vehicles. Despite these extra costs, professional 
organizations representing legal service providers are of the opinion that the 
identification (know your client) procedures have a positive impact on the prevention 
of money laundering and financing of terrorism.34 Still, we can observe that the 
company law reforms increasingly enable business parties to set up corporate 
vehicles without the intervention of professionals. It could be argued that this trend 
would only simplify the money-laundering process. However, one must bear in mind 
that corporate vehicles, in order to conduct activities, often have to open bank 
                                                
34 American Bar Association, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 23 April 2010. See also L.P. Cummings and Paul T. 
Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: AN Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money-Laundering 
through Commercial Transactions, Working Paper, 24 February 2011. 
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accounts which require the submission of VAT and corporate ID numbers. In fact, 
financial institutions remain the most suitable parties to prevent and combat money 
laundering. In this view, lawyers and other legal professionals provide an extra layer 
that serves as a safety net in the prevention of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering.35  
 The above discussion leads to a conundrum for policymakers and legislatures 
in that they have to take at least two main aims of law of corporate vehicles into 
account that may even be inconsistent and mutually exclusive. The main aims of the 
law are: (1) offer an organizational structure for parties to conduct their business in a 
way that is consistent with the “public interest” of society (the prevention of illicit 
activities), and (2) offer a corporate vehicle form that shuns formation and operation 
requirements, thereby spurring entrepreneurship and innovation. It appears that the 
latter function of company law prevails in firms operating in knowledge-intense 
sectors. Given the importance of entrepreneurship and innovation, governments 
around the world tend to streamline and modernize their incorporation requirements 
in order to become more competitive and obtain a better position in the 
competitiveness rankings. For instance, governments introduce simplified 
incorporation procedures in order to make it possible to use online systems that 
facilitate electronic filings of new business registrations. Obviously, the online 
systems bypass lawyers and other legal service providers in the incorporation 
process. It should therefore come as no surprise that US Senator Levin, who already 
in 2009 introduced a bill that would require states to collect and maintain beneficial 
ownership information upon the incorporation of these vehicles, has so far been 
unsuccessful.  
 It is only to be expected that governments, in their efforts to encourage 
entrepreneurship and job creation, increasingly rely on an investigative system to 
obtain information about beneficial ownership in corporate vehicles. Arguably, such a 
system stands or falls with the possibility for public authorities or appointed 
investigators to have access to the necessary information. It is therefore much more 
important that an effective enforcement and intervention system should be in place to 
be able to ensure compliance with the disclosure and reporting regimes for listed 
companies in a particular country.  
 
                                                
35 It should be noted that the Third Directive explicitly acknowledges this role by stating in Article 14 of 
the Directive that member states may permit that legal professionals rely on client due diligence 





 This essay highlights the importance of providing a corporate governance 
structure that can have an effect on protecting minority investors from conflicts in 
companies caused by concentrated ownership and control structures. It is crucial to 
reiterate that the legal and regulatory challenges raised by concentrated ownership 
are complex and that minority investors must have appropriate mechanisms to 
monitor and detect potential opportunism and expropriation. The existence of 
accurate disclosure and reporting requirements that provides transparency in the 
ownership and control structures of public companies is often viewed as the 
precondition for an effective corporate governance regime that alert minority 
investors to material changes in corporate control and ownership structures and to 
enable them to make an informed assessment of the effect of these changes.  
 The difficulties involved in tracing ultimate beneficial ownership and, more 
importantly, control make it onerous for minority investors and other stakeholders to 
discover and curtail self-dealing. This explains the trend, particularly after the recent 
financial crisis, toward stricter disclosure and reporting rules that help uncover the 
complicated control structures used by ultimate beneficial owners of listed 
companies.  
 However, we find, consistent with Bebchuk and Jackson, in order not to 
crowd out the positive effects of the interventions of outside blockholders (who will, 
as we have shown, be discouraged to monitor management in systems with overly 
costly and stringent disclosure and reporting rules and regulations), it is important for 
regulators to introduce a clear, but flexible, definition of (substantial) beneficial 
ownership. At the same time, this definition should allow for case-by-case 
determinations of beneficial ownership in order to enable regulators to include 
investors that use innovative financial instruments only with an eye to exert control 
over listed companies. Nevertheless, the design of a balanced and effective 
disclosure and reporting regime into a country’s corporate governance framework 
poses something of a challenge to the extent to which the timing and disclosure of 
the stakes should be made and channels through which they should be made. 
Without a proportionate and flexible reporting and disclosure regime, it is unlikely that 
countries will be able to combine the best of two “worlds”: protection against illicit 
related party transactions without creating disincentives for (outside) blockholders to 
monitor and discipline management. 
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 We then asked that, given concentrated ownership, regulators should be 
concerned to stem the flow of illicit related party transactions. It was pointed out that, 
in some cases, related party transactions can play a positive role for firms. But to the 
extent that illicit related party transactions are detrimental to firm performance, we 
argued that they can be identified and prevented by a range of techniques. In this 
respect, the recently implemented audit regulations in the EU, which were designed 
to restore and enhance investor confidence through increased disclosure and 
transparency of related party transactions, are more likely to prove effective in 
preventing the recurrence of Enron and Parmalat style irregularities. 
 We further assessed the multilateral and domestic initiatives to combat the 
misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes. There is clear evidence of an 
association between the ability to obscure the identity of the beneficial owners from 
the authorities and the use of legal entities to carry out illegal activities. The incidence 
of illegal activity carried out through legal entities suggests that this type of problem 
cannot be ignored and may require a comprehensive solution, which, as we have 
seen, may not rise immediately to the top of lawmakers’ reform agendas.  
 To conclude, there is a wide range of options to obtain information about 
beneficial ownership and illicit, related party transactions. After reviewing the three 
most promising initiatives for obtaining extensive disclosure of beneficial owners, it 
can be argued that flexibility and proportionality must prevail in a country’s disclosure 
and reporting regime. Firstly, a flexible regime, for instance, by offering “case-by-
case” solutions, has the benefit of making the disclosure and reporting regime 
adaptable to technological and market changes. Secondly, and related to this, a 
flexible regime ensures that beneficial owners that use derivative arrangements to 
seek control over a listed company can be better targeted.  
